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11I n t r o d u c t i o n
Why is Africa poor? Conversely, what has sustained the immense economic growth we have seen
in the U.K., the U.S., and other developed countries over the last couple of centuries? While there
is no single answer to these questions, technical change looms large among possible explanations.
From Solow’s seminal work on growth theory to the “new growth economics”, technical change is
the engine of long term growth. Whether you are looking at the phenomenal growth of Silicon
Valley or the stagnant poverty of much of rural Africa, the congruence between economic growth
and technical change is striking.
Joseph Schumpeter (1961)? describes technical change as having three stages: invention (the
ﬁrst realization of an idea), innovation (the ﬁrst bringing of an invention to the market place),
and diﬀusion (the spread of the innovation through the market place). Technical change becomes
economically important through diﬀusion. Looking at rural Africa’s lack of robust economic growth
and dearth of modern technology, it appears that technology diﬀusion has failed there. I propose
that this failure is partly due to institutional barriers to technology diﬀusion and technical change.
Ecology and history have conspired to create institutions that are hostile to new technologies. In
this paper I present a model of an institutional environment in a stylized rural African village that
prevents the diﬀusion of a proﬁtable, low-risk agricultural technology.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, I discuss the importance of
technical change and review some of the current theories on technology diﬀusion and institutions.
In sections 3 and 4, I give the background and motivation for the two linked games that I present in
section 5. In section 6, I discuss the equilibria of the linked games, and conclude with a discussion
2in Section 7.
2 Technical Change
The importance of technical change to economic growth has been noted for many years, al-
though it has recently received a jolt of attention due to the endogenous growth models of Romer
(1986,1990)??, Lucas (1988)?, and a host of others. Solow (1956)? originally noted the importance
of technical change to long run growth in GDP per Capita. In his neoclassical framework, however,
technical progress was assumed exogenous and available to all equally. This implies that all coun-
tries will eventually converge and grow at a constant rate. Clearly, this has not been borne out by
experience. In response to this problem the “new growth economics” emerged in the late 80’s, led
largely by Romer’s two papers. In the ﬁrst (1986) he presents a model where endogenous growth
arises from “learning-by-doing” spillovers. In the second paper (1990), endogenous growth is a
result of partially appropriable R&D, which has spillovers throughout the economy, thus assuring
long-run growth. A number of papers (Stokey 1988?, Young 1991?, Grossman and Helpman 1991?)
expand on the models to consider the eﬀects on Less Developed Countries (LDCs) and conclude
that poverty traps could emerge.
In contrast to the neoclassical theory, the practitioners of what Fagerberg (1994)? calls the
“technology-gap approach to economic growth” assume that there is a cost to transmitting knowl-
edge. They acknowledge that technology may be partially a public good, but that it is largely a
speciﬁc good “embedded in organizational structures (such as) ﬁrms, networks, or institutions.”
Therefore these theorists (including Nelson, Winter, and Dosi for example) believe that diﬀerences
3in technology are the key to diﬀerences in economic growth. Abromovitz and David (1994)? are
in this tradition, when they talk about the “catch-up” and “convergence” of OECD countries after
WWII. They attribute productivity catch-up to technological progress. One of the key issues in
this literature is whether the existence of a technology gap provides a beneﬁt to the “follower”
nation in terms of savings on R&D.
According to Fagerberg (1994), general empirical results are hard to come by, but one stylized
fact seems to emerge. A technology gap combined with either a high level of investment or education
leads to faster growth. In other words, a follower can have an advantage in certain institutional
environments. At a more general level, it is apparent that technical progress aﬀects productivity
growth and that productivity growth aﬀects economic growth.
Economic growth, however, is not the only reason for interest in technology diﬀusion. The rising
interest in environmental issues has also spurred interest in the diﬀusion of new technologies. This is
particularly salient in the case of developing countries and climate change. Developing countries –
India and China in particular – have a much larger potential for energy growth than the developed
countries. Also, they are currently using very ineﬃcient and pollution-intensive forms of energy.
The diﬀusion of clean and eﬃcient energy sources to the developing world will have a pay-oﬀ not
only for the recipient countries but also for the world as a whole.
2.1 Technology Diﬀusion
I concentrate on technology diﬀusion because 1) it is through diﬀusion that technical change be-
comes economically and environmentally important and 2) it is through diﬀusion that LDCs can
take advantage of the existing technology gap. Diﬀusion theory can be divided into three frame-
4works. The most common approach is built around information and uncertainty, and is typiﬁed
by Mansﬁeld (1968)?. He argues that the speed of adoption is directly related to the proﬁtability
of the new technology, and inversely related to the capital outlay, the initial uncertainty regarding
the proﬁtability, and the time required to reduce the initial uncertainty. But poor information and
uncertainty don’t explain the extreme inertia seen in Africa. Agricultural extension services are
common. Peace Corps volunteers have been working in Africa for 30 years, with little evidence of
technical change. On top of this, many of the new technologies oﬀered to rural farmers exhibit very
little risk compared to the current technologies.
A second approach is based on the heterogeneity of adopters. Stoneman (1987)? terms this
the “rank” approach, since one can think of ﬁrms (or consumers) as being ranked in order of the
beneﬁts they will get from adopting a new technology. As the price of a new technology falls, more
ﬁrms (or consumers) will gain a positive beneﬁt from adopting it, and therefore it will diﬀuse. There
is evidence that factors such as ﬁrm size, market power, ownership structure, and unionization all
eﬀect the speed of adoption (Stoneman and Karshenas 1995)?.W h y d o s u c h f a c t o r s a ﬀect the
ability of a ﬁrm to adopt a new technology? Most likely it is the institutional framework: the
internal organization of the ﬁrm and its external networks. All the inputs to a ﬁrm, including
production factors, capital, labor, insurance, and infrastructure will have an eﬀect on its choice of
technology. Similarly, the relationships with “downstream” actors, such as the buyers of its product,
will have an eﬀect as well. This is likely to be particularly important in developing countries where
market institutions are not well developed.
A third approach to diﬀusion is the strategic approach. When there are positive externalities
to adoption of a new technology, Beath et al. (1995)? show that excessive inertia can occur,
5and communities may get stuck in a Pareto-inferior equilibrium. This is most typically thought
of in terms of the characteristics of the technology itself. For example telephones, fax machines,
and Internet sites all have positive externalities. But more subtle externalities can arise as well.
Infrastructures that support new technologies often involve economies of scale. Paved roads and
convenient gas stations will generally not arise until a number of people are driving cars. New
technologies often require specialists to service and repair them, but it is not economic for a specialist
to locate in an area where there are only a few ﬁrms that need his help. Further, if the cost of
adoption is reduced due to information spillovers, then the adoption cost itself may be a function
of the number of current users, rather than just a function of time. Hence, positive adoption
externalities are not limited to speciﬁc network technologies. The question this paper looks at is
what kind of institutional framework favors one equilibrium over another.
3 Technology and Informal Insurance in Africa
After the success of the green revolution in Asia, there was great hope for similar success in Africa.
That hope has largely turned to despair. While the population has grown steadily food production
has not. There has been very little adoption of new agricultural technologies in Africa. In West
Africa, for example, nearly 100% of the increase in food production since 1960 has come from ex-
panded harvest area rather than improvements in technology (Eicher, 1992)?. This land expansion
is ineﬃcient and cannot continue indeﬁnitely, or even much longer (Sanders et. al., 1996)?.A l r e a d y ,
marginal land is being farmed, causing environmental damage (Anderson and Hazell, 1994)?.W h y
have new technologies (including high yielding varieties of seed, animal traction, and improved
6agronomic practices such as terracing) not been adopted in Sub-Saharan Africa? There are a num-
ber of suggested, inter-related causes for the technical stagnation in the literature ranging from
lack of credit, human capital, appropriate institutions or infrastructure to excessive risk aversion.
I investigate institutional barriers to technology diﬀusion, particularly informal risk-sharing
institutions. Historically, Africans have faced harsh and unpredictable conditions. Various forms of
informal insurance have arisen in response to this environment. I consider the interaction between
technology adoption and two forms of insurance: ex-post smoothing of idiosyncratic shocks through
community sharing and old-age insurance.
3.1 Community Risk Sharing
Development literature is full of cases of farmers who made spectacular gains in
harvests, yet deserted their improved practice a year or two later because of peer or
group pressure (Bunch, 1982)?.
Development workers have long noticed that a new technology was unlikely to be retained in
the long run if only a small number of farmers adopt it in the short run. On the other hand,
if a “critical mass” of local farmers adopt an innovation, then the probability that it will still
be in use ﬁve or six years later is quite high. This “critical mass” usually ranges from 25% to
45% of the community, but in some “tightly organized” communities it may encompass everyone
(Bunch, 1982). Sociologists explain that traditional communities are accustomed to living in an
environment of consensus. How can an economist explain this? I believe at least part of the answer
lies in community risk sharing schemes.
Udry(1994)? presents evidence of ex-post risk sharing in Northern Nigeria in the form of
7contingent loans. Interest-free “loans” are extended to those in need with no speciﬁed payment
schedule. The understanding is that the loan will be paid back when the lender himself falls into
need. The sharing of grain or meals with farmers who are temporarily in need is common in Africa
(see e.g. Fafchamps, 1992)?. Platteau and Hayami (1998)? describe how accusations of witchcraft
are used to persuade the “lucky” to share their bounty with the community. These practices
work against the adoption of new technologies in a couple of diﬀerent ways. There are free-rider
problems: since extra gains are shared with the community, incentives to increase production are
severely curtailed. Even worse, if the community does not have full information on the costs or
yields of a new technology it may overestimate the returns and demand more sharing. In my
experience in Ghana it was a common fear that relatives and neighbors would overestimate an
individual’s wealth and therefore insist upon “gifts” more than the individual could comfortably
aﬀord. Ligon (1998?) presents evidence that, indeed, there is not full information sharing in many
small villages and that the amount of risk successfully smoothed reﬂects this. If the community
underestimates the cost of a new technology (such as fertilizer), it would reduce the expected return
of adopting that technology. If the community is expected to make mistakes regarding the actual
value of the harvest, it would increase the variance of the income stream under the new technology.
The above analysis would apply primarily to technologies that are entirely new to a region.
Given generations of experience with traditional technologies, yields (and work eﬀort) can be well
estimated by glancing at a ﬁeld, and costs are well-known. Introducing diﬀerent crops or seed
varieties or new agronomic practices may cause the community to be less sure of how much was
actually harvested. If, alternatively, the entire community (or at least a critical mass) were to
become familiar with a new technology, then this risk could be alleviated. This may explain the
8“critical mass” phenomenon. This tendency to avoid new technology in the presence of community
risk sharing will be reinforced by the informal old-age insurance that I describe below.
3.2 Old Age Insurance
How can a rural African farmer assure adequate support in his old age? There is little formal old
age insurance available to self-employed farmers in Africa, so this is a pressing question. If a farmer
owns cattle or land, he can use that to secure his old age, either directly by selling it oﬀ as needed,
or indirectly by using it as a strategic bequest (see Bernheim, Shleifer and Summers, 1985)?.I n
the latter case, the farmer can promise his property to those who support him in his old age. As
long as the value of the property is greater than the expected value of the support, someone should
comply. Throughout much of West Africa, however, land is not owned by an individual, but rather
by the local chieftaincy, who divides it among the local people to be farmed. When a friend of mine
in northern Ghana decided he wanted to farm, he simply rode his bike around until he saw a fallow
ﬁeld, then requested its use from the chief. A strategic bequest of land under this arrangement
would be ineﬀective at best. Additionally, many poor farmers do not have cattle or any durable
property that could serve as a strategic bequest. Their situation is diﬃcult. Altruism from son to
father is a possible motivation for old-age care, but may not be relied upon. An alternative model
is suggested by Bergstrom and Stark (1993)? w h e r es o m ep e o p l ea r ep u r ei m i t a t o r s ,a n dw i l lc a r e
for their aging parents as they saw their parents care for their own aging parents. Other people in
this model are rational maximizers. They show that the optimal choice for the maximizers is often
to care for their aging parents. Nevertheless, if mistakes were made in such a society, the aging
farmers may not feel secure. Simmons (1960)? points out that in poor, traditional cultures most
9old people perform some kind of work or service for as long as they are able. It is not uncommon
for those who can no longer be of service to be supported at a minimal level, or not at all.
One of the services that an aging farmer can provide to the household is sharing the beneﬁto f
his experience. Often he has farmed the same ﬁelds, using the same technology, for a lifetime. He
has witnessed many diﬀerent weather patterns, shortages, infestations, etc. He is in an excellent
position to advise. Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1985)? presented evidence that households with at
least one elderly farmer had above average yields in years of bad weather. But the value of an
elder’s experience is based largely on the existence of stagnant technology. If a new technology is
adopted, the diﬀerential beneﬁt of the elderly’s experience will almost surely be reduced. Using a
modern analogy, think of all the adults with years of experience operating TVs who were quickly
outpaced by their children after buying a VCR. In fact, sometimes years of experience with an old
technology can be a detriment to using a new technology (Perez and Soete, 1988)?. For example,
some of the modern high-yielding varieties of rice grow at a predetermined pace, regardless of the
weather or the season. In contrast, the traditional varieties go through diﬀerent stages according to
the season, regardless of when they were planted. All the signs that signalled that a certain stage
was being reached for a traditional variety may be misleading for the new variety. In this case, the
old farmer would have no service to perform for the farm, and chance being left without adequate
support. Therefore, older farmers who will have to rely on their children for support may resist
new technology.
104 Linked Games as an Institution
The theory of institutions is very young and still in the midst of being deﬁned. Institutions are
commonly thought of as organizations. Douglass North (1991)? points out, however, that the
interesting issues are the formation and structure of the rules that organizations follow when making
decisions and acting. Hence, he deﬁnes institutions as “the rules of the game or, more formally the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interactions.” Aoki (2001)? argues even further,
that an institution is an outcome of a game - a self-enforcing Nash equilibrium. Otherwise, diﬃcult
questions arise, such as: where did the rules come from; and who is enforcing them? Some examples
of institutions are social norms, a formal legal system (where the state is considered a player of
the game), corporate governance arrangements, and internal ﬁrm organization. Finally, Sugden
(1986)? points out that to be considered an institution there must be more than one equilibrium.
Otherwise, technical constraints, rather than humanly constructed constraints, deﬁne the outcome.
What qualiﬁes the informal insurance arrangements discussed in the previous section as in-
stitutions? They involve multiple equilibria and linked games, and are ﬁrmly rooted in speciﬁc
institutional environments. For example, assume that the parameters of the new technology and
the community risk sharing arrangement are such that adoption of the new technology by any
individual is blocked. This leaves the possibility of two distinct equilibria. The ﬁrst is that no one
in the community adopts the new technology. The second is that the entire community adopts the
technology together, thus learning enough about it to prevent information problems. The second
equilibrium is clearly Pareto-superior to the ﬁrst. What would cause the inferior equilibrium to be
chosen? The explanation lies in other institutional arrangements that interlink with the community
11risk sharing game. One example of such a link is the old age insurance game. Because of retirement
needs, the older generation prefers not to adopt a new technology, even if it is superior. If the
bargaining power lies with this older generation, it may be uneconomic for individuals from the
younger generation to adopt on their own, given the community risk sharing. Thus the two games
reinforce the lack of technical change. The risk-sharing game keeps the sons from adopting the
new technology unilaterally. The old-age insurance game keeps the risk-sharing game in a lower
equilibrium.
But one can step back even further and analyze the impact of other institutions on the insurance
arrangements as well. Land rights have a major impact. Due to the historical abundance of land,
institutions reinforcing strong private property rights to land have not arisen in Africa; nor has an
ethic to conserve land or use it wisely. Since land is not privately owned, it cannot be used for
retirement. This leaves the aged to rely on altruism, their experience, and what little work they can
do for support. This in turn may lead them to reject new technologies. Land rights also impact the
equilibrium in the community risk sharing game. If a farmer wants to increase his production, he
can trade oﬀ the beneﬁts of a new technology with the beneﬁts of farming more land. Historically,
farmers have chosen to farm more land. Recently, however, the quality of available land has been
much poorer than in the past. Nevertheless, the beneﬁts of keeping the same risk structure (by using
the same technology on new land) may outweigh the beneﬁts of the new technology. Thus, even if
adopting the new technology would be marginally better than continuing with the old technology,
it may not be as good as keeping the old technology and expanding the land farmed.
Ex-post community risk sharing is itself only one possible form of reducing risk and increasing
utility. One example of an alternative is ex-ante community cooperation. For example, in Japan
12during the Tokugawa period, it was common for villagers to work together to build and maintain
irrigation systems (Aoki, 2001)?. This reduced risk by providing a regular water supply. Addition-
ally, it increased the expected return and left the villagers as residual claimants of their own proﬁts.
Platteau and Hayami (1998)? suggest that the rise of these two contrasting institutions is related
to the relative abundance and scarcity of land. Aoki counters that the American west, for example,
had a similar abundance of land, and yet very diﬀerent institutions developed there. Either way,
the speciﬁc form of risk sharing found in much of Africa is a barrier to technology diﬀusion.
The institutional environment eﬀects the games in other ways as well. State-provided pensions
or even community-provided pensions would change the nature of the old-age insurance game.
Agricultural extension eﬀorts that focus on transferring technology to only a subset of local farmers
may inadvertently add to the inertia.
5 The Model
5.1 Old Age Insurance Game.
There are two periods in the old-age insurance game. In the ﬁrst period, both the head of household
(the “father”) and his son work the farm. In the second period, the father is elderly and only the
son works. I assume that land is free and abundant (see Platteau and Hayami 1998), and so the
s o nc a nl e a v ea ta n yt i m et os t a r th i so w nf a r ma nd avoid having to share the output with his
father. Given the negative real interest rates and low incomes found in many developing countries,
I assume that savings for retirement is minimal. I assume no altruism between family members,
and therefore a commitment problem exists: how can the father assure himself consumption in the
13second period? The answer is in the experience he has gained through working the same ﬁelds year
after year. I assume that each of the players gains experience for each period he works. The father
always has one period of experience more than the son does.
The father will always prefer to hire the son in the second period if the son’s reservation price
is below the total farm proﬁt (wages are not deducted). This is because he must have some
consumption in the second period, or he will die. In the ﬁr s tp e r i o dt h es o nh a s“ l o w ”e x p e r i e n c e
and the father has “medium”. The son’s reservation price in the ﬁrst period will be the proﬁt
he can earn farming alone with low experience. The total farm proﬁt (with father and son) will
be the proﬁt earned by farming with two laborers and medium experience. The father will be the
residual claimant after paying the son’s reservation price. In the second period the son’s reservation
price will increase to reﬂect his medium experience. Since the elderly father is not working, he will
only be able to capture the diﬀerence between the proﬁt under medium experience and under high
experience.
Speciﬁcally, let proﬁt π be a function of experience level (e =0 ,1,2), number of laborers
(L =1 ,2), and technology (t = t0,t 1). First period total proﬁts are π(e,L;t)=π(1,2;t) and the
son’s reservation price is π(0,1;t); thus the father’s residual is π(1,2;t)−π(0,1;t). Similarly, in the
second period the father’s residual is π(2,1;t)−π(1,1;t). I assume constant returns to labor for both
the old and new technologies: given that land is free and abundant, a second laborer simply adds
a second plot of land. Thus, the father prefers to hire the son: π(1,1;t) <π (1,2;t)−π(0,1;t).L e t
the father’s discount factor be δ,a n du be the time-additive utility function. ti i =0 ,1 represents
the "old" or "new" technology respectively. The father’s total payoﬀ under technology i is
14PFi = u[π(1,2;ti) − π (0,1;ti)] + δu[π (2,1;ti) − π(1,1;ti)] (1)
I assume that the new technology, t1,i ss u p e r i o r :
π (e,L;t1) >π(e,L;t0) (2)
but that it erodes the father’s experience advantage:
π(e +1 ,L;t1) − π (e,L;t1) <π(e +1 ,L;t0) − π(e,L;t0) (3)
The idea is that this experience is gained over time: it is valuable precisely because the technol-
ogy does not change. The son is unambiguously better oﬀ under the new technology. If he were able
to adopt the new technology unilaterally and employ it on his own farm then his reservation price
in the two periods would be π(0,1;t1) and π(1,1;t1). The father, on the other hand, may be worse
oﬀ. In particular, if there is little or no savings and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution is
low, then the father will categorically prefer the old technology to the new.
This is a principal-agent game, with a twist. The principal (the farmer) relies on the agent for
two diﬀerent arrangements: for labor, and for old-age insurance. This allows the agent to capture
much of the beneﬁt of a new technology.
155.2 Community Risk Sharing Game.
Communities can self-insure against idiosyncratic risk. Udry (1994) presents evidence that ex-post
sharing is used to smooth risk in northern Nigeria. Coate and Ravallion (1993)? present a model
of ex-post risk sharing without commitment. They show that a lack of commitment will cause
risk sharing to be less than optimal if both parties are very poor or if the spread between realized
incomes is too large. They, however, assume that there are no information problems. This is
reasonable in a small rural community where all the farmers are using similar technology. If a new
technology is introduced, however, and only a small subset of farmers adopts it, then information
problems may arise. The community’s assessment of a farmer’s harvest under a new technology
would contain some “noise”. For example, if one farm were growing a new hybrid or a new crop,
the other farmers may not be able to accurately judge his harvest or the cost of his inputs and
therefore misjudge the amount he has to share.
I model risk sharing with n players. Each player’s proﬁts are independent random variables Pi,






Pj − ¯ Pj
¢
+ ¯ Pi (4)
Risk sharing is fair and eﬃcient: it does not impact each player’s expected value; and each players
variance is reduced to σ2
n . This is equivalent to the optimal transfer in Coate and Ravallion (1993).
For expository purposes, I assume that proﬁts under the new technology have the same distri-
bution as under the old technology, only shifted to the right. This assumption strongly favors the
adoption of the new technology. In the numerical example below, I use a more realistic assumption
16that the coeﬃcient of variation (CV) stays constant across technologies.
I am only interested in the community’s response to idiosyncratic risk, rather than to community—
wide risk, so I assume that the players’ proﬁts are independent of each other. I further assume that
the technologies are mutually exclusive.
What happens if there is an information problem? What if the community cannot accurately
determine the proﬁts of an adopter? Assume that there is some “noise” on the community’s
assessment of the adopter’s proﬁt. Speciﬁcally, assume that z is a random variable distributed
with mean and variance (0,σ a), where σa is the amount of uncertainty around the assessment. If
one person adopts and the community continues with the same sharing rule, then each members
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In order to consider the case of m adopters, I must make an assumption about how the amount of
noise experienced by the community changes as the number of adopters changes. I assume that the
noise increases linearly until half the community adopts, and then decreases linearly. Thus, given
m ≤ n







The variance in (7) above is greater than the variance under the old technology, σ2
n .T h u s ,
17adoption of a new technology increases risk, even when the technologies themselves have identical
variances when they stand alone. An extension agent that did not recognize this would underes-
timate the amount of risk presented by a new technology. The adopter is getting more expected
value in return for the greater variance, but the community is strictly worse oﬀ.
I assume that the adoption of a new technology by a subset of the community leads to one
of two outcomes: the community continues to share as before, accepting the added risk; or the
community chooses not to share with the adopters. The community will compare the variance
with and without sharing. If the community chooses not to share with the m adopters then each
non-adopter’s total variance will be σ2
n−m.
6 Equilibria of combined games
To explicitly link the games I assume that each father and his son share risk in the same way as
the community in general, and that when they work together, they farm twice as much land, thus
their risk is reduced.
The equilibria depend on how the game is structured. I consider three alternate structures.
In Structure I, I formulate a three-stage game as follows: ﬁrst, each son decides simultaneously
whether to adopt or not; second, each father decides; third, the community decides whether to
risk share or not. In Structure II, I reverse the order of the ﬁrst two stages: each father decides
simultaneously, then the sons decide. Again, the community decides whether to risk share in the
third stage. Finally, in Structure III, all members of the community decide simultaneously whether




















Structure I Structure II
Figure 1: The father-son subgame, under two diﬀerent assumptions about the structure of the
game.
illustrates the extensive form representation of the subgame played by a particular father-son pair
under Structures I and II. Note that I am assuming that the father will never adopt unless the son
does; and the son will adopt if the father does.
I analyze three possible equilibria — a no-adoption equilibrium; a full-adoption equilibrium; and
a blocking equilibrium. In order to check the no-adoption equilibrium in each of the three game
structures I need to determine under what conditions a) the father will refuse to adopt, given that
the son has adopted; and under what conditions b) the son adopts, given that the father has not
adopted. These two conditions deﬁne the equilibrium in all three structures.






community will choose not to share if σ2
a ≥ n
n−mσ2. I assume this condition is satisﬁed for m ≤ n
2.
To make the discussion concrete, I assume that each farmer has an exponential utility function,
u(x)=1− e−ζx that satisﬁes the expected utility property, and that all proﬁts are distributed
normally. I can then use the simpliﬁcation that the certain equivalent (CE) of a normal random
variable with mean µ and variance σ2 is equal to µ−
ζσ2
2 . The expected utility of x is greater than
19the expected utility of y i fa n do n l yi ft h eC Eo fx is greater than the CE of y.T h u sIw i l lw o r k
in certain equivalents. Additionally, I will assume that consumption in the two periods are perfect




Consider the father’s decision, assuming that the son adopts. The father must work with the son
in the second period in order to have any income. So, the father must adopt in the second period.
His decision is whether to adopt now or wait until the second period. The father may choose
not to adopt if the gains from risk sharing with the community outweigh the gains from the new
technology. If the father adopts now his CE is




where the bar over the random variable indicates the expected value. If he waits and adopts next
period







1That is that the time-additive utility function u(c)=c. This has no impact on the father’s decision, since his
utility is the same in the second period whether he waits or adopts now. This assumptions makes the son more likely
to choose adoption.
20The father will refuse to adopt if and only if (8) ≤ (9). Rearranging the terms, the condition for
non-adoption can be written as follows:
ζ (n − 3)
4(n − 1)
σ2 ≥ [¯ π (1,2;t1) − ¯ π (0,1;t1)] − ¯ π(1,1;t0) (10)
On the right-hand side is the father’s gain from adopting in the ﬁrst period, given that his son
has adopted. This is always positive since
¯ π (1,2;t1) − ¯ π (0,1;t1)=2 ¯ π (1,1;t1) − ¯ π (0,1;t1) ≥ ¯ π(1,1;t1) > ¯ π(1,1;t0) (11)
On the left hand side of (10) are the risk-sharing gains from not adopting. Thus the father will
refuse to adopt when the value of risk sharing is high (high riskiness, large community, high risk
aversion) compared to the beneﬁt from the new technology.
6.1.2 Son’s Decision
Deﬁne the expected payoﬀ f o rs o n si nas i m i l a rm a n n e rt o( 1 ) :
PSi ≡ π (0,1;ti)+δπ(1,1;ti) (12)




















The son chooses not to adopt if
σ2 ≥
4n
ζ (n[2 + δ] − 2[1+δ])
© ¯ PS1 − ¯ PS0
ª
(15)
Again, it is more likely that the son will choose not to adopt when the value of risk sharing is
high compared to the beneﬁt from the new technology.
6.1.3 Equilibrium Conditions for No-Adoption
To analyze when no-adoption is an equilibrium, assume that all other families have chosen not
to adopt, and focus on the sub-game between one son and one father. Under Structure I, where
the son makes the adoption decision in the ﬁrst stage, no adoption is a unique sub-game perfect
equilibrium (of the father-son subgame) only if both conditions (10) and (15) are satisﬁed. This is
because the father’s threat to not adopt must be credible. Under Structure II, on the other hand,
where the father makes the adoption decision in the ﬁrst stage, only the son’s condition (15) must
be satisﬁed for no adoption to be a unique sub-game perfect equilibrium. Finally, under Structure
III, where the decisions are simultaneous, no adoption is a unique equilibrium if (10) and (15) are
both satisﬁed; and adoption is a unique equilibrium if neither (10) nor (15) are satisﬁed. If the
son’s condition (15) is satisﬁed, but the fathers condition (10) is not satisﬁed, then both adoption
and no-adoption are equilibria in the father-son subgame.
22Thus, I have shown that it may be an equilibrium for a clearly superior, stochastically dominant
technology to be not adopted. The non-adoption equilibrium becomes more likely as the noise σa,
increases, as risk aversion increases, when the community is large, and when the beneﬁtf r o mt h e
new technology is small. In Section 7 I provide an empirical example.
6.2 Full adoption equilibrium
Assume all families but one are adopting. In this case, the single non-adopting family will choose to
risk share with the adopters. Thus the son is always better oﬀ adopting, regardless of the father’s
action. And given that the son will adopt, the father is better oﬀ adopting too. Full adoption is
always an equilibrium.
6.3 Blocking Equilibrium.
Consider a game where the factions in the community attempt to coordinate. A blocking equilib-
rium is where the fathers, by coordinating against adoption, can block the sons from coordinating
for adoption. In game structure I, where sons adopt ﬁrst, blocking is never an equilibrium. The
fathers cannot credibly threaten to not-adopt, given that all the sons have. This is because a
father’s variance in the ﬁrst period if he doesn’t adopt is σ2
n/2; if he does adopt it is σ2
n/2+1.T h u s ,
each individual father has an incentive to adopt immediately. The fathers cannot credibly block
adoption under the assumptions of this game. If the sons coordinate they can successfully adopt
the new technology.
In game structure II, I need to check when it is optimal for the sons not to adopt as a group,
given that the fathers have not adopted. If the sons do not adopt then their ﬁrst period variance is
23σ2
n ; if they adopt their ﬁr s tp e r i o dv a r i a n c ei s σ2
n/2. Thus the sons may be blocked from adopting if




Thus, blocking is an equilibrium in this game, but requires a rather large underlying risk, σ.
In game structure III, all the fathers are one player, and all the sons are the other player. When
they decide simultaneously then adoption is the unique equilibrium if (16) is not satisﬁed; both
adoption and no-adoption are equilibria if (16) is satisﬁed.
7 Numerical Example
In Section 6, I show that non-adoption is an equilibrium under certain conditions. In this section
I consider a numerical example based on evidence from the development literature. In the above
analytical work I assumed that the variance was the same for the new and old technology. A more
realistic assumption is that the coeﬃcient of variation, ν, (the standard deviation divided by the
mean) is the same across all technologies (See Anderson and Hazell 1989, 1994??). Thus, I assume
that each player’s standard deviation σi = ν ¯ Pi. For risk sharing to be fair and eﬃcient we need to






24Then each player’s expected value is the same with and without risk sharing, and each player’s









If there are m ≤ n
2 adopters, noise increases linearly, and the sharing rule stays the same, then each






Assume that the base technology has a proﬁt of $500 given one unit of experience and $400 given
zero units. I consider a small innovation, that leads to proﬁts of $550 and $480, respectively, and
a large innovation that leads to proﬁts of $800 and $750 respectively. The ﬁrst question is how
large the "noise" needs to be for the community to refuse to share with the adopters. For a small
innovation, the noise would have to be between 20% and 30% larger than the underlying risk, that
is σa ≈ 1.2σ. For a large innovation, the noise only need be about equal to the underlying risk.
These numbers imply that the community must perceive a rather large risk when one member
of the community adopts a new technology. As I have modeled the game, the noise σa is purely
technical — it results from not understanding the new technology. But the introduction of such
noise poses a new risk to the community: the adopter may shirk, knowing that the community
doesn’t understand the costs and requirements of the new technology. This fear may be enough for
the community to refuse to share risk with the adopter of a new technology.
The parameters that impact the father’s decision to adopt are the riskiness of the technology
25(as represented by ν), the level of risk aversion, and the size of the community. Evidence from
Turkey (Binici et al., 2003?) implies that the risk aversion coeﬃcient for small-holder farmers,
assuming an exponential utility, is around .1 over a range from $0 to $30,000. The range of
incomes in this paper are between $0 to $800, so for the central case I use a risk aversion coeﬃcient,
ζ, approximately equal to .1 ∗ 400
15,000 ≈ .0025. This level of risk aversion implies that a farmer
is indiﬀerent between Normal distributions with the following means and standard deviations:
N(500,300) ∼ N(550,360) ∼ N(800,574). I also consider ζ = .01,.005, and .001. The discount
factor has a very small impact — the results are very similar when δ =0and δ =1 . These two values
also represent the extreme assumptions of no substitution across periods and perfect substitution
across periods.
Table 1 shows the smallest coeﬃcient of variation (CV) that satisﬁes conditions analogous to
(10) and (15). For example, if the father is medium risk averse (ζ = .0025) and in a risk-sharing
community with 30 farmers, then he will refuse to adopt a small innovation if the coeﬃcient of
variation for idiosyncratic risk is greater than .72. The same farmer will refuse to adopt a large
innovation if the CV is greater than .89. By contrast, a son with ζ = .0025 a n di nar i s ks h a r i n g
group of 30 will refuse to adopt the small innovation if the CV is greater than .53,a n dw i l lr e f u s et o
adopt the large innovation if the CV is greater than .71. From our numerical examples it appears
that the father’s condition is more stringent than the sons — if the father can credibly threaten to
refuse adoption, then the son will also refuse adoption.
To put these numbers in perspective, Walker (1989?) ﬁnds that the mean CV for grain yields
for individual households in three villages in India range from .44 for cotton, to .69 for sorghum.
I have not found any evidence on individual-level risk in sub-saharan Africa. Elamin and Rogers
26ζ = .01 ζ = .005 ζ = .0025 ζ = .001
Father n =6 n =3 0 n =6 n =3 0 n =6 n =3 0 n =6 n =3 0
small innovation .41 .36 .58 .51 .82 .72 1.3 1.1
large innovation .47 .44 .67 .63 .95 .89 1.5 1.4
Son
small innovation .28 .27 .39 .38 .56 .53 .88 .84
large innovation .36 .35 .5 .5 .71 .71 1.1 1.1
Table 1: The smallest CV that induces no-adoption
(1992)? report that the country-wide sorghum yields in the Sudan have a CV of about .3. In Hazell
(1989)?, the country-wide CV for sorghum in South Africa and Nigeria ranged between .04 to .27,
compared to India with a country-wide CV for sorghum of about .09. Thus, it seems reasonable
that individual farmers in many parts of rural Africa may face a CV in the range between .5 and
.7. Our conclusions are that if farmers are very risk averse (ζ ≥ .005), then no-adoption is a likely
equilibrium regardless of the structure of the game. If risk-aversion is more moderate (ζ ≈ .0025),
then no adoption is a possible equilibrium, as long as the sons are not committing to the adoption
in the ﬁr s ts t a g e .I fr i s ka v e r s i o ni sv e r yl o w ,( ζ ≤ .001), it is unlikely that risk sharing will have
an impact on technology adoption. While the level of risk aversion and the amount of idiosyncratic
risk is an open empirical question, it appears that community risk sharing may put downward
pressure on the adoption of new technology.
8 Discussion
In Section 6, I show that there are at least two equilibria of the technology adoption game — no
adoption and full adoption. I show additionally, that depending on the structure of the game,
the older generation may credibly block adoption, even if the younger generation coordinates.
27Moreover, I only speciﬁcally model two inter-related games. It is likely that the institutional
structure of rural communities in Africa consist of a number of interrelated games. Some examples
are the relationship between farmers and the "Market women" who sell their produce, relationships
based on non-farm employment, and relationships that underpin community conﬂict resolution. A
strong preference by the elder generation against adopting a new technology may be enough to
choose the non-adoption equilibria over the adoption equilibria. Extension eﬀorts may not help the
situation, by focussing on model farmers, rather than community acceptance and understanding of
a new technology.
I can make some initial predictions from examining this institutional arrangement. I would
expect to see inertia in technology diﬀusion in regions where there is no old age insurance and
where land is abundant, or individual property rights are not strong; that new technologies would
be more likely to be adopted by younger families, and less likely by multigenerational families; that
technologies would diﬀuse better if they were oﬀered to the community as a whole rather than
to a model farmer or a small select group; that technologies that diﬀered very little from the old
technologies would diﬀuse faster, since there would be less of an information problem associated
with them; and that the level of risk aversion would matter, even if the new technology had a
similar level of risk as the old technology.
Diﬀerent institutional environments may help to explain diﬀerent rates and levels of technology
diﬀusion. Informal insurance schemes in Africa that arose during a time of stagnant technology
may inadvertently undermine modern technology diﬀusion. Many failed attempts have been made
to transfer new technology to Africa. The failure of these attempts may be attributed to a lack
of understanding of the particular institutional environment into which the technology was to be
28transferred. A better understanding of indigenous institutions - both formal and informal - will
allow new institutions to be developed that can aid the diﬀusion of technology and therefore spur
economic growth. In Africa, institutions that can smooth consumption without reducing production
incentives are crucial to developing the economy.
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